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A Purpose for Every Time?
The Timing and Length of the Work Week and
Implications for Worker Well-Being
LONNIE GOLDEN
Would replacing the conventional work week with a four-day option
benefit economic performance and well-being? In the framework of
economics, the question is whether work week reform can make some
individuals better off without making other individuals worse off in ways that
do not hamper other goals such as efficiency, economic growth, and equity.
Social and individual welfare outcomes would depend on whether reforming
the work week involves shortening the length of the work day versus
rearranging the timing of work. The “public good” case for a policy that
induces shorter hours of work per employee is a logical extension from
evidence of the adverse effects stemming from excessively long hours of work
on workers’ stress, work/life balance, and productivity per hour. A shorter
work week may improve workers’ well-being if it creates more total
employment opportunities; allows more free time to be used at employees’
discretion and gives them greater control over work; is accompanied by
partial income replacement under certain states’ “work-sharing” programs;
and is well targeted toward workers who prefer shorter hours than they are
currently working. Given the heterogeneity of work hour preferences by stage
of life-cycle, the most promising Fair Labor Standards Act reform proposals,
from an individualistic standpoint, would be those ensuring that employers
consider individual employee requests for flexibility in the number of hours or
the times when the employee is required to work per day or per week.
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A Purpose for Every Time?
The Timing and Length of the Work Week and
Implications for Worker Well-Being
LONNIE GOLDEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Would a four-day work week improve the performance of the
economy and benefit society any more than the conventional five-day work
week? To answer this, this Article addresses the following questions:
Why is the work week fixed so tightly at five days?; What are the potential
repercussions of flexibility that would allow a shorter work week versus a
rearranged work week?; If the work week was shortened either by fewer
days or shorter work days, what is the potential for more jobs to be created
or preserved?; What improvements in employee well-being could be
expected?; and finally, What would currently pending legislative proposals
that involve regulation of work time do for the well-being of working
families?
II. SHOULD THE WORK WEEK BE REARRANGED?
The answer depends largely on what criteria we adopt to evaluate the
status quo versus a policy-induced change. In the field of economics, any
market or policy outcome can be evaluated using four criteria: the effects
on social or individual welfare, economic efficiency, social equity, and
economic growth. Of course, the weight attached to each of these is
entirely subjective and will be the determining factor regarding the
evaluation of the policy in question. For the issue at hand, we must
* Dr. Golden is a Professor of Economics and Labor Studies-Employment Relations at Penn State
University, Abington College. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Illinois-Urbana.
His research focuses on working hours, work scheduling, well being, FLSA overtime law and
regulation, work hour preferences, workplace flexibility, overwork, work-life balance, students’ time
use, non-standard jobs, the behavioral economics of labor supply and the relationship of work hours to
aggregate employment. He is co-editor of the books, Working Time: International Trends, Theory and
Policy Perspectives (Routledge, 2001) and of Nonstandard Work: The Nature and Challenge of
Changing Employment Arrangements (Cornell University Press, 2000). His research has appeared in
academic journals such as Industrial Relations, Monthly Labor Review, Journal of Business Ethics,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Journal of SocioEconomics, Labor Law Journal, and Labor Studies Journal. He is a research affiliate of the Sloan
Work and Family Research Network, and the Penn State University Center for Work and Family
Research. He serves on the editorial board of the Review of Social Economy and the Journal of SocioEconomics.
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distinguish the compressed work week from the shortened work week
because each criterion may be affected differently. The shortened work
week may take two, perhaps quite different, forms: (1) a temporary
adjustment downward during economic downturns; or (2) a more
permanent or indefinite change. The desirability of any policy will hinge
on whether it improves overall social welfare, not just the well-being of a
few. It is common in the field of economics to judge a policy-induced
reallocation of resources and its associated income as desirable as long as
those who benefit from the change gain more than the losers lose. Better
yet, it would enhance welfare if the induced change is “Pareto-improving,”
making at least one individual better off without making any other
individual worse off. In theory, market forces are presumed to adjust so
that no one can be made better off without making someone else equally
worse off. But in practice, real world impediments such as limited
knowledge and information, negative externalities, and the relative
immobility of labor and its relatively lower bargaining power vis-à-vis
employers, may make it possible to improve social welfare with a carefully
designed policy intervention. The welfare case also derives from the
nonmonetary benefits of shorter or rearranged work time, such as more
time off and potentially lower stress and fatigue incurred from work.
The efficiency (static or instrumental, labor used to full potential
capacity) case for adopting a shorter work week hinges on the extent to
which it minimizes layoffs and spells of unemployment. In addition, the
efficiency case for a rearranged work week in terms of its timing depends
on the extent that fewer, but longer, work days will help firms minimize
their costs in the long run, including those associated with running capital,
such as utility expenses. Thus, there may be both a macroeconomic and
microeconomic case for such policies. Similarly, to the extent that the
rearranged work week shortens the duration and depth of an economic
contraction, it contributes to the longer term rate of economic growth
(long-run labor productivity improvement). Finally, the equity
(justice/fairness in the workplace, household, and economy) case for
shorter hours is built on the presumption that it more evenly distributes the
potential pain from economic downturns and gains from economic
expansions.
The social welfare case for a public policy that induces shorter hours
of work per employee is at least somewhat a logical extension from the
economic case for attempting to restrain excessively long hours of work
scheduled per employee:
(1) Excessive work hours are a cause of symptoms of
“overwork”—a high risk of detrimental effects to mental or
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physical health. The perceived value of sacrificed time may
be underestimated; both workers and managers discount the
long-term risk (or benefits) to well-being and/or sustainable
productivity when contemplating excessive hours.2 At the
individual level, with short time compensation (“STC”), the
welfare loss due to income loss may be offset almost entirely
by the time gained, depending on how such extra time is
used.
(2) Excessive work hours have negative externalities, such
as public health risks, and crowding out of time that has a
beneficial social and economic purpose as human and social
capital development, such as time for parenting, civic
activity, and studying.3 For example, the leading reason
students identify that leads them to drop out of college is the
time pressure, stress, and student performance reduction due
to having to work (sometimes full-time hours).4
(3) There is imperfect functioning in labor markets, with
overemployment
and
underemployment
existing
simultaneously in the same industry or occupation, if not
often in the same enterprise or organization.5 Unfortunately,

1
See ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., FAMILIES & WORK INST., OVERWORK IN AMERICA: WHEN THE
WAY WE WORK BECOMES TOO MUCH, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2005) (finding that workers who
were overworked were more likely to experience higher levels of stress and more apt to suffer from
clinical depression and overall poor health); Francis Green, It’s Been a Hard Day’s Night: The
Concentration and Intensification of Work in Late Twentieth-Century Britain, 39 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL.
53, 53–55 (2001) (discussing the effect of longer work hours and work pressure on mental and physical
health).
2
See Lonnie Golden, Flexible Daily Work Schedules in U.S. Jobs: Formal Introductions Needed?
48 INDUS. REL. 27, 29–30 (2009) (noting positive results for both the employer and the employee when
employees are offered more flexible schedules); Chung-Ping A. Loh, Physical Inactivity and Working
Hour Inflexibility: Evidence from a U.S. Sample of Older Men, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 257, 258
(2009) (stating that lack of time due to working hour restrictions is one of the major reasons behind the
lack of exercise by many individuals); see also generally Edward Shepard & Thomas Clifton, Are
Longer Hours Reducing Productivity in Manufacturing?, 21 INT’L J. MANPOWER 540 (2000).
3
See Claire C. Caruso, Possible Broad Impacts of Long Work Hours, 44 INDUS. HEALTH 531,
533–34 (2006) (summarizing research finding that long work hours may lead to public health concerns
if fatigued workers make errors, and that long hours may lead to “reduced participation in civic
organizations, voting, and church attendance”); see also generally THE LONG WORK HOURS CULTURE:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CHOICES (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2008) (exploring the
various motives for working long hours and the varied consequences of work hours on individual,
family, and organizational health); WORK, FAMILY, HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING (Suzanne M. Bianchi
et al. eds., 2005) (surveying the effects of long work hours and scheduling mismatches on the quality of
family life, child development, communities, and workplaces).
4
PUBLIC AGENDA, WITH THEIR WHOLE LIVES AHEAD OF THEM: MYTHS AND REALITIES ABOUT
WHY SO MANY STUDENTS FAIL TO FINISH COLLEGE 5–7 (2009).
5
See Patricia E. van Echtelt et al., The New Lumpiness of Work: Explaining the Mismatch
Between Actual and Preferred Working Hours, 20 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 493, 502 (2006) (showing
that overemployment is increasingly the product of “post-Fordist” job design, which combines high
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such mismatches by preferences do not tend to resolve
themselves in the labor market over time.6 Rather, workers
tend to quit their jobs to find a better match regarding hours,
leading to extensive costs involved with mobility and loss of
specific human capital for workers and employers.7 When
preferences regarding the duration of working time are
disparate in a labor market, the equilibrium will produce too
few jobs with relatively short hours to match workers’
preferences.8
(4) There is malfunctioning at the macroeconomic level
resulting in unemployment (e.g., the current recession), some
of which could be curbed by institutional innovations that
forestall or prevent layoffs from occurring in the first place
(e.g., STC).9
The establishment of an overtime pay premium in the United States in
1938 was grounded in the supposition that this would curb the quantity of
employers’ hours of extra labor demanded per week, per employee.10 The
production expectations with job autonomy, and is less due to supervisor imposition of longer hours
than worker-preferred hours).
6
See, e.g., Dominique Anxo et al., Introduction: Working Time in Industrialized Countries, in
WORKING TIME AND WORKERS’ PREFERENCES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: FINDING THE
BALANCE, at 1, 5–6 (Jon C. Messenger ed., 2004) (describing the need to obtain more data about
“workers’ needs and preferences”); Lucie Davoine & Dominique Méda, Work More To Earn More?
The Mixed Feelings of Europeans, 148 INT’L LAB. REV. 15, 31–34, 42 (2009) (analyzing possible
factors that may affect an employee’s working hours preferences); Steffen Otterbach, Mismatches
Between Actual and Preferred Work Time: Empirical Evidence of Hours Constraints in 21 Countries,
J. CONSUMER POL’Y 1–2 (2009) (discussing various work hours constraints); van Echtelt et al., supra
note 5, at 494–95 (discussing restrictions on employees in their choice of working hours).
7
See Kerwin Kofi Charles & Philip Decicca, Hours Flexibility and Retirement, 45 ECON.
INQUIRY 251, 267 (2007) (stating that hours constraints may force workers to partially or fully retire);
Sarah Senesky, Testing the Intertemporal Labor Supply Model: Are Jobs Important?, 12 LAB. ECON.
749, 751–53, 770–71 (2005) (finding that “lifetime utility” considerations fall behind an employee’s
decision to transition to a new employer to find a better match for his or her preferred number of
hours).
8
James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs?
An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 257, 258 (1995).
9
See WAYNE VROMAN & VERA BRUSENTSEV, URBAN INST., SHORT-TIME COMPENSATION AS A
POLICY TO STABILIZE EMPLOYMENT 1 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/
411983_stabilize_employment.pdf (advocating for short-time compensation, in which “labor hours are
reduced in line with the change in output, but the decrease in hours worked is spread among a larger
pool of employees than under layoffs,” which may help preserve existing jobs and reduce further
losses); Michael Huberman & Chris Minns, The Times They Are Not Changin’: Days and Hours of
Work in Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000, 44 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 538, 563 (2007) (noting
the difficulty in determining the effect of various institutions, such as tax codes and welfare policies,
across national workforces).
10
See MARC LINDER, THE AUTOCRATICALLY FLEXIBLE WORKPLACE: A HISTORY OF OVERTIME
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 134 (2002) (discussing how the FLSA overtime provisions
developed out of state laws that were passed to restrain the work week and spread employment,
eventually settling on the use of a financial disincentive over criminal sanction to achieve the intended
result); see also Stephen J. Trejo, Does the Statutory Overtime Premium Discourage Long
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social welfare case for the overtime law rests on the assumption that
additional income, which the regulation denied those workers who were
already working at least forty hours per week, would create less net
welfare loss than the welfare gain if the same hours and income went to
those whose hours were short or zero. That is, instead of scheduling ten
hours of overtime per week for four employees, employers would create a
new job or move two employees from twenty hours per week to forty if
they preferred a full-time position. Indeed, those who worked precisely
forty hours were no more likely to feel underemployed than those working
fewer than forty hours. This argument is supported by the fact that
workers with long hours, even those paid by the hour and likely to qualify
for premium overtime pay, were more likely to feel “overemployed”—that
is, a greater willingness than those with fewer hours to forego income in
order to shorten their hours of work.11 The overtime pay premium in the
United States apparently is not much of a “binding constraint” that is
unfairly denying workers the opportunity to work more hours to earn more
income.
To establish standards across all United Nations member countries, the
International Labor Organization developed a subset of policy suggestions
that promote “decent working time,” as part of its “Decent Work”
initiative.12 Its five separate, but potentially overlapping, items can be
categorized as arrangements that would: (1) preserve worker health and
workplace safety; (2) enhance labor productivity; (3) be “family-friendly”;
(4) facilitate workers’ choice and influence over their own working hours;
and (5) promote gender equality.13 These are broad goals, often
reinforcing but not necessarily compatible (e.g., more productive, but more
family-friendly).
III. IS THERE AN IDEAL WORK WEEK DURATION AND/OR ARRANGEMENT?
At the individual and household level, there may in fact be an ideal
work week; however, this is not necessarily the case across all workers at
the national level, nor even for some individuals as they progress through
different stages of the life cycle. Every country in the world has faced this
question and tackled it somewhat differently. When the Fair Labor
Workweeks?, INDUS. LAB. REL. REV., Apr. 2003, at 530 (providing evidence that expanded coverage of
the overtime pay premium does not actually suppress use of overtime hours in the long run, presumably
because employers eventually adjust straight time wage rates downward).
11
Lonnie Golden & Tesfayi Gebreselassie, Overemployment Mismatches: The Preference for
Fewer Work Hours, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 2007, at 18, 32.
12
See International Labor Organization, Decent Work for All, http://www.ilo.org/global/About_
the_ILO/Mainpillars/WhatisDecentWork/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2010); see also JeanYves Boulin et al., Decent Working Time in Industrialized Countries: Issues, Scopes and Paradoxes, in
DECENT WORKING TIME: NEW TRENDS, NEW ISSUES, at 13, 13–40 (Jean-Yves Boulin et al. eds., 2006).
13
See Jon C. Messenger, Towards Decent Working Time, in DECENT WORKING TIME, supra note
12, at 419, 419–44.
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Standards Act (“FLSA”) was passed over sixty years ago, most jobs were
full-time and held by the household’s primary “breadwinner,” making it
easy to establish a standard schedule that was based on a five-day work
week with a predictable, regular eight-hour work day and fixed daily start
and end times. By 2004, only twenty-three percent of households fit the
traditional breadwinner/homemaker married couple household model;14
barely half of the workforce was on a traditional 8:00/9:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. daily schedule, while as many as sixteen percent of the workers
could not, when asked, specify the typical end time of their work day.15
In sum, if there is evidence that a four-day work week would heighten
individual well-being, increase job opportunities, or increase productivity,
then it is a laudable goal. Thus, this Article examines whether temporary
work sharing, a reduction in the standard work week, and/or more control
over the timing of work hours creates more employment opportunities,
greater labor productivity per hour, and the potential for gains in worker
well-being. While there is not necessarily an “ideal” or “optimal” onesize-fits-all work week for everybody at every point in time, there may be a
“goldilocks” work week—one that is not too long, not too short, and that
satisfies both the employer’s interest in maximizing and improving
productivity and the employee’s interest in maximizing well-being. It
must be recognized that employers have a long-term interest in their
employees’ well-being, too, to attend to the long-run cost savings involved
with improved retention and recruiting when their employees experience
less stress or life satisfaction (i.e., happiness).
Individuals have a keen interest in time, of which there are at least four
facets.16 One facet of time is how it is textured, which may be a cultural
perception (e.g., linear versus cyclical or seasonal). Most pertinent here is
the clearly limited quantity of time. Within a given quantity of time,
individuals try to coordinate time, to create rhythms, patterns, or
regularities. For those employed, particularly those with parenting
responsibilities, there is an increased perception of a chronic shortage of
non-work time.17 Another facet of time is intensification or pace. One
example is the experience of “speed up,” which may occur in both work
14
TOM W. SMITH, NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. CHI., CHANGES IN FAMILY
STRUCTURE, FAMILY VALUES, AND POLITICS, 1972–2006, at 29 tbl.9 (2007), available at
http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/gss/documents//SCRT/SC53%20Changes%20in%20Family%20Struct
ure,%20Family%20Values,%20and%20Politics,%201972-2006.pdf.
15
News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Workers on Flexible and Shift
Schedules in May 2004, tbl.7 (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/flex.pdf.
This figure is about triple the proportion that reported this when it was first measured in 1985. See
generally Earl F. Mellor, Shift Work and Flexitime: How Prevalent Are They?, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Nov. 1986, at 14.
16
TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND THE BALANCE OF LIFE 2–9 (2002).
17
JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER
INEQUALITY 28–29 (2004).

2010]

A PURPOSE FOR EVERY TIME?

1189

and non-work spheres. This includes “harried leisure” time for consumers
who are fortunate enough to enjoy growing affluence but with limited
time.18 A final facet is the experience of time deepening, such as
attempting ever more tasks or activities within a given unit of time.19
In order to more explicitly consider the importance of timing and
coordination issues regarding working hours, the conventional economic
model of optimal labor supply must be augmented. Workers have an
interest in the timing of work. Increased flexibility—i.e., any
rearrangement that provides individuals more decisional latitude,
discretion, or autonomy in scheduling work across a day or week—gained
in a given job allows workers to better coordinate the timing of their work
and non-work activities.
Even mainstream economic models recognize that the “marginal utility
of income” depends on an individual’s health or injury status, just as it
does on the health and human capital development of their own children.20
Thus, having the flexibility to alter the timing of a given number of work
hours, such as compressing it into four rather than five days, may produce
a higher level of well-being for a worker who prefers or adapts positively
to such a rearrangement.21 Thus, the worker’s well-being is higher than if
his or her job produced the same level of income and non-work, free or
leisure time—the traditional two items in the standard “utility function” in
the economic approach. From the perspective of labor supply, whether
well-being increases following a policy-induced shorter (or rearranged)
work week or work day depends on what happens to the components of
utility—the associated changes in income, leisure time, and ability to
control the timing of both work and leisure time.
The above discussion neglects the labor demand perspective and
focuses solely on labor suppliers. That is why flexible work arrangements
are not available to all employees who might benefit from arrangements
such as compressed work weeks, flexible start and end times, and work-athome opportunities. Shift lengths that are long and/or fixed may serve to
minimize average labor costs.22 High and/or growing “fixed costs” of
employment, such as hiring and training costs, insurance costs fixed per
employee, paid leave times, and payroll tax contributions, create an
incentive for employers to extend hours of work per employee rather than
18

STAFFAN BURENSTAM LINDER, THE HARRIED LEISURE CLASS 10–12 (1970).
See LOTTE BAILYN ET AL., SLOAN WORK-FAMILY POLICY NETWORK, INTEGRATING WORK
AND FAMILY LIFE: A HOLISTIC APPROACH 5–6 (2001), available at http://web.mit.edu/workplace
center/docs/WorkFamily.pdf.
20
E.g., Arleen A. Leibowitz, An Economic Perspective on Work, Family, and Well-Being, in
WORK, FAMILY, HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING, supra note 3, at 187, 188–91.
21
See Harry J. Holzer, Work and Family Life: The Perspective of Employers, in WORK, FAMILY,
HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING, supra note 3, at 83, 83 (noting that many individuals and families prefer
the family-related benefits enabled by flexible work schedules).
22
See id. at 84–85.
19
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hiring new employees during expansion times, and use layoffs rather than
work-sharing practices during downturns.23 In theory, employers may
need to implement compensating wage differentials for workers who
receive flexibility in scheduling, or any family- or worker-friendly
benefits; however, the evidence is mixed as to whether the labor market
produces them. There may be up to a twenty percent wage reduction,24 or
even a positive association with wages to the extent there are positive
effects on worker productivity.25
Compressed work weeks and, to some extent, reduced work week
options, are both employee benefits (i.e., “job amenities” or perks) that
reduce “fixed costs of working,” or time-based stresses balancing work and
family life.26 This potentially enhances workers’ welfare and serves as a
productivity-enhancing tool for management of human resources. Thus,
they involve for employers a comparison of the costs of adopting versus
the costs of not adopting them. The optimal level of such work time
flexibility provided by employers will depend on the cost estimates of
firms regarding the managerial or administrative implementation or
transition, monitoring, and potential abuse costs associated with such
practices.27 It also depends on an employer’s time horizon, since most of
the costs may occur up front or in the short run, while most of the cost
savings accrue over the long run (e.g., reductions in turnover, absenteeism,
tardiness, unauthorized sick time) and any sustainable gains are
uncertain.28 Indeed, flexible work practices such as compressed or
temporarily reduced work weeks might boost employee productivity
indirectly because of their welfare-enhancing effects: these practices allow
employees to better coordinate their work activity with other activities to
avoid productivity-impeding time conflicts (e.g., school, daycare, traffic
congestion, natural circadian rhythms), as well as fostering higher job
satisfaction among employees in the long run. Moreover, employers may
choose not to implement such practices if: (1) they overestimate the true
costs of the above; (2) they underestimate the true costs savings or the
potential wage rate reductions they would eventually receive by offering
23

See id. at 86–87.
John S. Heywood et al., The Implicit Wage Costs of Family Friendly Work Practices, 59
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 275, 291 (2007).
25
Kim A. Weeden, Is There a Flexiglass Ceiling? Flexible Work Arrangements and Wages in the
United States, 34 SOC. SCI. RES. 454, 461 (2005) (identifying popular reasoning that flexible work
schedules enhance employee productivity and wages).
26
See id. at 476 (concluding that “employees who do some or all of their work at home are
neither better nor worse off than their fixed-location counterparts, but employees who work flexible
schedules enjoy wage premiums relative to their fixed-schedule employees”).
27
Morris Altman & Lonnie Golden, The Economics of Flexible Work Scheduling: Theoretical
Advances and Contemporary Paradoxes, in WORKPLACE TEMPORALITIES, at 313, 321–22 (Beth A.
Rubin ed., 2007).
28
See id. at 320 (noting the heterogeneous nature of costs and benefits for the employer as
compared to the employee).
24
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flexible work options as a valued non-wage benefit to employees; (3) they
consider their own “utility” more strongly than that of their employees in
maintaining the managerial discretion to selectively allocate flexibility; or
(4) they withhold such benefits when their bargaining leverage is relatively
greater than their employees’ leverage. For these reasons, and the
properties of flexibility as an underprovided but necessary “public good”—
having spillover benefits beyond just the firm and worker, on to the health
of families, communities, and economic and ecological sustainability—
there is a compelling case to be made that their adoption must be pressed
by the public sector or government and not just private employers based
even on long-term self-interest alone. Indeed, the conditions conducive to
work week flexibility are ripe for adoption in some occupations more than
others. Generally, exempt jobs (often salaried) feature far more work day
flexibility than nonexempt jobs.29 For example, lawyers and judges are
more than twice as likely as the average employee to be allowed to change
their daily start and end times for work.30
In the latest International Social Survey Programme module on “Work
Orientations,” those employed were asked to describe how their start and
finish times of working hours were decided. In 2005, in the United States,
almost half of all employees (45%) had no say in the decision, and only
15% felt they were free to decide their own work schedules.31 The General
Social Survey in 2006, “Quality of Working Life” module, found that only
20% of the workforce felt that flexible hours in a job is not an important
feature.32 Moreover, the survey found that about 47% of men and 37% of
women who received salaries were able to “often” change their daily work
schedule. This is in contrast to only about 20% of both men and women
who were allowed to do so in hourly paid jobs. The proportions who were
“never” allowed to change their schedules were about 40% for salaried
workers and 24% for the hourly paid workforce.33 Thus, the ability of
workers to influence the timing of their work in their daily schedules is
currently a glass at least half empty, and far more than half for the hourly,
relatively lower paid workforce.
Is there an optimal level of hours per week? Some analysts have found
that there is a strong and quite homogeneous preference among men for a
standard full-time work week. Among women, however, the preference is
quite heterogeneous. It varies considerably by age (i.e., life-cycle stage)

29

See Golden, supra note 2, at 45.
Id. at app. 53–54.
31
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SURVEY PROGRAMME, WORK ORIENTATIONS III (2005). Data on file
with author.
32
GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, MODULE ON QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE (2006). Data on file with
author.
33
Id.
30

1192

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1181

34

and their share of household work. Among households with dual earners
in salaried positions, there is a strong convergence toward sixty hours of
work among intact households with children. When both parents work up
to but, do not exceed, sixty hours per week combined, these sixty-hour
couples report improved well-being and less work/family conflict.35 In
Australia, women in dual-earner households prefer to work just under
three-quarters as long as their partner works—twenty-eight and forty
hours, respectively, in the average household.36 This is not too dissimilar
from the “one and a half jobs” per household model attributed to the
typical labor force participation of households in the Netherlands.37
IV. THE CASE OF WORK-SHARING
Work-sharing is considered to be any type of policy-induced,
downward adjustment of working time. Shortened work weeks might be
intended to be permanent or temporary arrangements. The former have
been popular with certain European governments and labor unions, either
as a reward in the form of leisure time for productivity gains achieved or as
a potential means for spreading employment opportunities, particularly to
those who have faced difficulty finding employment.38 A key goal of both
arrangements is a higher employment level—the first, by counteracting the
structural issues, and the second, by combatting the cyclical forces that
restrain job creation or encourage job destruction and job security among
the employed. The temporary types of work-sharing may be promoted
through government programs designed for the purpose of preventing or
postponing planned layoffs by employers, thus preserving employment,
typically during recessions. The STC program in the unemployment
insurance system tends to benefit employers in the long run by saving them
burdensome training and hiring expenses when a downturn eventually
ends. In North America, Canada and seventeen U.S. states have adopted
34
See E. Jeffrey Hill et al., Researching the 60-Hour Dual-Earner Workweek: An Alternative to
the “Opt-Out Revolution,” 49 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1184, 1185–86 (2006) (observing that many
women choose to work part-time or leave their careers entirely once they become mothers).
35
Id. at 1193.
36
See Brigid van Wanrooy, A Desire for 9 to 5: Australians’ Preference for a Standard Working
Week, 17 LAB. & INDUSTRY 71, 85 (2007). Generally, men prefer to work about ten more hours per
week than women. See Jeremy Reynolds & Lydia Aletraris, Pursuing Preferences: The Creation and
Resolution of Work Hour Mismatches, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 618, 626 (2006).
37
See Jelle Visser, The First Part-Time Economy in the World: A Model To Be Followed?, 12 J.
EUR. SOC. POL’Y 23, 24–26 (2002); see also generally Janneke Plantenga, Combining Work and Care
in the Polder Model: An Assessment of the Dutch Part-Time Strategy, 22 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 53
(2002).
38
See William K. Roche et al., Working Time and Employment: A Review of International
Evidence, 135 INT’L LAB. REV. 129, 130–31 (1996) (describing the renewed interest in work-sharing in
Europe as reflected in the mandatory adoption of a Working Time Directive by the European Union,
which seeks to redistribute the total volume of work in order to increase employment opportunities for
those seeking work).
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STC as part of their unemployment insurance programs. They vary in size
and number of participating workers; number of participating companies;
amounts of wage subsidies and/or tax incentives offered to promote worksharing; links between work-sharing and training/retraining activities for
affected workers; specific time limits on the availability of work-sharing
measures; and the total financial outlays associated with the work-sharing
program. In the STC program, employers must choose to register with the
unemployment insurance system and announce a potential reduction in
workforce in an affected work unit. Employees can enjoy replacement of
lost earnings, typically based on half of the overall percentage of reduced
hours within the work unit, for up to twenty-six weeks while the reduction
is still in force.39
The main value of STC might be more as a “defensive measure,”
preventing layoffs that would lead to a long spell of unemployment for a
worker. The potentially positive effects of STC are for the macroeconomy,
employers, and workers—unemployed and employed alike. It also may act
as an automatic stabilizer to keep consumption spending from going into a
free fall. Under certain circumstances, work-sharing may promote the
creation of new jobs and thus promote a stronger or more hastened
recovery. Perhaps most importantly, and most often neglected, the
reduction in daily hours or number of days at work per week grants those
who remain employed additional time off—time that they can devote to
other uses ordinarily not attended to.
Is the ideal work week shorter than the current standard? When it
comes to permanent reductions in work weeks, there are many possible
filters—with both direct and indirect effects—which exist between
transforming a reduction in standard hours into eventual employment
creation effects. The potentially positive direct effect is that employers
will be compelled to create more jobs to recoup potential drops in output.
This occurs to the extent that hours and employment are substitutable in
total labor input. Employment effects at the macroeconomic level occur
only if aggregate demand (i.e., total spending) is not reduced, but rather
shifted in composition. This depends on adding more employees who are
subject to “diminishing returns” and daily “set-up costs” for employers
being relatively low. This would mitigate the potentially negative effects
on employment if overall output was reduced. To minimize direct negative
effects on output due to restricting work hours, evidence suggests that
shortening work days is superior to reducing the number of days, given the
fixed costs of work for employers.40
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There are several indirect effects that act as potential “offsets” to the
translation of reduced hours into more jobs.41 The clearest offset is the rise
in per-unit labor costs that employers will incur if per-hour pay is not
reduced proportionately, which creates adverse “scale effects” at the
individual firm level. The consequent rise in average costs of production,
if it cannot be passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices,
would reduce the total demand for labor, hours, and employees.42 If the
rise in costs is passed along to consumers, then it would ultimately reduce
demand for output, and thus firms would need fewer employees.
Similarly, if the firm’s capital capacity becomes more underutilized, its
costs would escalate. Moreover, as the ratio of fixed costs of labor per
hour worked rises, this incentivizes longer scheduled hours and “labor
hoarding” rather than new job creation. Even with standard hours reduced,
firms might rationally choose to keep the duration of hours steady. This is
the “overtime leakage effect,” because some of the hours of work per
employee now become “overtime” hours. If these hours are paid,
particularly at premium overtime pay rates, this in turn might also increase
unit labor costs. Alternatively, if the additional hours are not paid for, they
would result in a larger workload for salaried workers.43
Another factor is referred to as the “productivity offset.” Firms may
respond to an externally-imposed reduction in the standard work week by
rearranging or reorganizing work hours, perhaps across the year (e.g.,
“annualization”) or quickening the expected pace of workers (i.e.,
increasing the average intensity of an hour of work). Also, some workers
previously working long hours may have suffered from fatigue at the end
of their daily shifts or work week. These responses tend to foster a higher
rate of worker productivity per hour, which can circumvent the need to hire
more employees to recoup lost output. The most stubborn limit on how
much employment will gain—in other words, how much unemployment
can be reduced—is the extent to which there is a mismatch or difference in
the skills between the unemployed and the employed.44 Indeed, reducing
hours can actually backfire to the extent skilled and unskilled jobs are
complementary and a work week reduction leads to less use of both
physical and human capital.45 If most of the unemployed are unskilled,
and skilled and unskilled labor are complements, then a reduction in work

41
See Jennifer Hunt, Hours Reductions as Work-Sharing, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 339, 340–41.
42
Id. at 340.
43
See id. at 353; Roche et al., supra note 38, at 140.
44
Richard B. Freeman, Work-Sharing to Full Employment: Serious Option or Populist Fallacy?,
in GENERATING JOBS: HOW TO INCREASE DEMAND FOR LESS-SKILLED WORKERS, at 195, 215–16
(Richard B. Freeman & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1998).
45
Id. at 216.
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time of skilled labor actually decreases the demand for the unskilled
unemployed.
In sum, the size of the subsequent employment effects of reduced work
hours are likely to be positive, but may be substantially suppressed if they
are followed by a rise in the level of per unit (average) labor cost per hour
or a rise in the ratio of fixed relative to variable labor costs. The amount of
employment created also may be limited by any subsequent increase in
overtime hours (beyond the reduced standard work week) used by
employers; a rise in average labor productivity per hour; a reduced rate of
capital capacity utilization; or an inadequacy of qualified labor available
for the new positions created. The overall net effect on employment
depends on the extent to which the potential direct effect of increasing
employment, to make up for the hours reduction, is offset by these several
potential indirect effects that obviate the need for new hiring.
This, however, may not be the end of the story. Work-sharing and
other forms of hours reduction should not be judged to be of limited value
because they trigger a boost in average labor or organizational
productivity. While a standard hours reduction may dampen productivity
per worker, if it indeed leads to higher average productivity per hour of
work, this would actually reduce, not increase, per unit labor cost.46 The
potential gain in the rate of labor productivity per hour makes labor a
relatively more attractive resource for employers to retain or hire in the
long run and help counter a rise in costs. This enhances rather than stifles
the perhaps small or negligible immediate job creation effects. In addition,
productivity offsets may exist only in the short run and evaporate over the
long term. Furthermore, the productivity offset may not be symmetric at
every level of hours. It tends to be smaller if average hours worked are
already under forty. If unit labor cost increases can be avoided, for
example, via rationalization or intensification of work or increased capital
capacity utilization, a reduction in hours may actually somewhat promote
the goal of greater efficiency, welfare, and, quite likely, equity, all without
harming economic growth.47 Unit labor cost increases can also be avoided
in cases where the reduced hours are accompanied by fixed hourly wage
rates, such as in the case of state-sponsored work-sharing measures and/or
by reinforcing government subsidies for hiring, such as reduced payroll
taxes (as undertaken in France).48 To reduce the potentially adverse effect
on labor cost of higher overtime hours, changing the underlying economics
of the employers’ hours decision—for example, reducing the ratio of fixed
46
Gerhard Bosch & Steffen Lehndorff, Working-Time Reduction and Employment: Experiences
in Europe and Economic Policy Recommendations, 25 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 209, 212 (2001).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 235, 238; Anders Hayden, France’s 35-Hour Week: Attack on Business? Win-Win
Reform? Or Betrayal of Disadvantaged Workers?, 34 POL. & SOC’Y 503, 508 (2006).
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to variable costs of labor by pro-rating the costs of employee benefits—
might induce a replacement of jobs for hours of existing employees. In the
specific case of a work week compressed down to four days, states such as
Utah have experienced a surprising, but fiscally welcome, reduction of
paid overtime hours, saving the state millions of dollars.49
Potentially adverse effects on employment also can be avoided if
shortening shift lengths induces some employers to add new shifts and the
unemployed are trained in the skills needed to get hired by firms whose
hours per worker have been shortened.50 In the long term, there is not a
complete immobility between skill levels and occupations. Mobility or
upgrading may indeed occur in actuality at the workplace level, under
certain conditions, particularly during an eventual period of
macroeconomic upswing. Collectively bargained programs have had more
success in inducing employment gains than those adopted as a national
policy.51 The actual effects of work-sharing on employment are difficult to
ascertain empirically because some of the effects occur through job
retention rather than job creation.52 Indeed, job maintenance may be the
predominant and most valuable contribution of work-sharing.
While it may not profoundly reduce unemployment, the social and
economic benefits of a reduction in work hours may occur through other
channels, benefiting individuals and the macroeconomy. For example,
work-sharing, even when compulsory, grants workers time off from work
that they likely did not have before, and which they might well value. A
survey conducted among 1500 employees facing compulsory 5%
reductions in work hours and earnings presents illuminating results.53 On
average, the workers spent 45% of their new non-work time on leisure
activities such as resting, reading, and hobbies, and 43% of their time on
other work such as housework, childcare, and nonmarket chores. The
amount of time spent on other work rose with the presence of children,
especially for women. About 12% of their newly free time was spent on
uncompensated work for the company, which was positively correlated to
income, education level, and younger ages. The employee reaction to the
program was favorable, but far more so for married women than married
men. Workers who spent more of their free time working without pay at
the company, or in home production, were much less positive about the
program than those who spent more time on leisure activities. The
49

Jennifer Senior, The Four-Day Workweek; Getting Over Overtime, N.Y. MAG., Nov. 9, 2009.
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findings are consistent with recent evidence that men who do not work
spend more time than their employed counterparts on leisure activities
(e.g., watching television), but also spend somewhat more time sleeping
and doing household production work.54 The findings are also consistent
with the changes in leisure time found in France following the reduction in
the standard work week from thirty-nine to thirty-five hours.55 The
individual welfare change attributed to hours reductions such as worksharing depends on the degree of income lost versus uses of time gained.
Those workers whose perceived aversion to loss of income is lower than
their aversion to loss of time—and whose perceived probability of being
laid off is high—may wind up with an increase in well-being. For others,
however, who do not meet this criterion, their well-being may decrease.
The net welfare gain might be greatest if the hours reductions were
targeted toward mismatches in the labor market, specifically toward
overemployment, which occurs when individuals express a willingness to
incur reduced income in order to attain shorter working hours. Some
regard overemployment as a more potentially damaging mismatch to
employers and the economy than underemployment (i.e., working fewer
than one’s preferred number of hours and earning less income).
Overemployment can be mitigated only through tardiness and absenteeism,
while underemployment can be mitigated through secondary job holding or
unpaid work during the unpreferred non-work time. Those who would
prefer a reduction in hours tend to be workers with the longest hours.
According to an analysis of U.S. Current Population Survey data from
2001 (the last time a relevant question was asked), the overemployment
rate in the workforce was 5.6% among those working precisely 40 hours,
but 8.1% among those reporting 41 to 48 hours, 9.6% among those
working 49 to 59 hours, and 13.3% among those working 60 hours or
more. Overemployment is also almost double among workers who usually
work full-time rather than part-time. Also, women are almost twice as
likely to feel overemployed than men: 8.6% versus 5.4%, respectively.56
This reinforces the results of a recent poll finding that between 1997 and
2007, working mothers preferred converging toward part-time work at the
expense of both full-time work and not working.57 However, those
working the standard forty-hour work week have, on average, the least
influence over their own schedule, but long-hours and short-hours workers
54
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appear to have more scheduling flexibility. Thus, the opportunity for a
compressed work week might be welcomed most by those who work
standard forty-hour work weeks, which comprises a full half of the overall
workforce. Through an analysis of the 2006 U.S. General Social Survey,
we can identify some of the specific (i.e., self-reported) well-being
outcomes for workers who have some control over the timing of their work
activity—having the flexibility to set or influence their own work
schedules.59 The two specific indicators examined here are work stress and
happiness among the employed.
Working longer hours, working extra hours at least one day per month,
and working a full-time job all increase work stress. Thus, even
controlling for the difference between full-time and part-time employment,
longer work hours are associated with higher stress. In contrast, the ability
to take time off during the day and the ability to set or change start and end
times of work are associated with significantly lower levels of work stress.
Working longer hours, however, does not impinge on levels of selfreported happiness. In fact, working extra days is somewhat associated
with higher happiness, although this might reflect simultaneity, such as
happier workers being more willing and able to put in extra work.
Nevertheless, when workers have this flexibility, it significantly raises
their happiness.
V. CONCLUSION: POLICY OPTIONS—COMPENSATORY TIME FOR
OVERTIME, LEGAL RIGHTS TO REQUEST AND REFUSE
Laws and regulations can increase the chances of improving social
welfare and individual welfare outcomes by reforming the work week in
ways that do not hamper other economic goals such as efficiency, growth,
and equity. Can we promote “Pareto-improving” reallocations of work
time such that at least one individual is made better off without making any
other individual worse off? The most promising approach from this more
individualistic standpoint would be adopting proposed legislation that
would ensure employers consider individual employee requests for flexible
work and conditions within two weeks of such a request.60 This legislation
would specifically authorize an employee to request from an employer a
change in the terms or conditions of the employee’s employment if the
request relates to: (1) the number of hours the employee is required to
work; (2) the times when the employee is required to work, including
compressed work weeks; or (3) where the employee is required to work. It
would be unlawful for an employer to interfere with any rights provided to
58
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an employee under this type of legislation. Employers can deny such
requests only if the identifiable costs of the change in terms requested in
the application—such as loss of productivity, costs of retraining or hiring
employees, or costs of transferring employees from one facility to another
facility—exceed the overall financial resources involved.61
The proposed law is quite similar to one adopted already in the United
Kingdom, as a “right to request” under the Flexible Working regulations,
which enables mothers and fathers and carers of adults to request shorter
hours (for an indefinite time period).62 Reforms now under consideration
would extend the scope of flexible working laws to parents with children
up to the age of eighteen rather than the current age of sixteen (raised from
age six in 2007) and would make such rights to request available to all
workers, regardless of parental status.63 Future discussion might include
making one’s arrangement portable to their next full-time job. Likewise,
the recently adopted Australian “National Employment Standards” include
a similar legal right to request a flexible schedule, reduced hours, an
extension of unpaid time off, and part-time work when returning from
parental leave.64 It also sets the new work week norm at thirty-eight hours,
to be used for calculating “overtime” and determining how much of that
time is considered “reasonable” (or “unreasonable”).65 By 2009, fifteen
U.S. states had passed laws that place restrictions on the use of mandatory
overtime beyond the usual work week, with a protected right to refuse such
additional hours. Virtually all such laws, however, are limited to nurses
and other healthcare workers.66 Moreover, federal laws have been
proposed, such as the Safe Nursing and Patient Care Act of 2007,67 which
languished in the House Subcommittee on Health. All such laws are
61
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consistent with the “Work & Family Bill of Rights,” which advocated a
right to negotiated flexibility over hours, the ability to shift between fulltime and reduced hours as family and personal circumstances change, no
mandatory overtime, and flexible schedules mutually agreed upon by
employees and employers.68
Proposals in the previous, Republican-controlled Congresses attempted
to alter the FLSA rules regarding the payment of overtime wages at a
premium, which would have allowed employers to pay future
compensatory time off (“comp time”) in lieu of pay, if employees signed
such an agreement.69 While compelling in that it provided workers much
needed time off, such a law was bound to be counterproductive as an
attempt to reduce working hours and/or improve worker well-being. From
the perspective of labor demand, there is good reason to believe that
employers would demand more overtime hours, ironically, from those
employees who signed a preference for shorter work time. The legislation
would make scheduling longer work weeks relatively cheaper because it
allows employers to store comp time credits for up to a year and have the
final say in when overtime work gets scheduled and when comp time use
could be denied. Comp time could potentially be forcibly scheduled by
employers according to their own preference rather than that of employees.
If the law were to foster true worker “choice” by allowing for refusal of the
originally scheduled overtime hours and allowing workers to decide the
use of their comp time unless it would clearly “cause substantial and
grievous injury to the employer’s operations” (rather than the proposed
lower standard of “avoidance of ‘undue disruption’ of business or
operations”), it might actually deliver some reduction in overemployment
among certain workers.
In a large survey, workers—mostly unionized workers—were asked
the following question: “If you had a choice, would you rather be paid
time-and-a-half for overtime hours or get time-and-a-half OFF for the
overtime hours you work?”70 Nearly 80% of those surveyed preferred pay
compensation. As many as 32% of salaried workers, however, reported
that would take the comp time option (including those who would consider
taking either comp time or pay), and women preferred comp time (25%)
68
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somewhat more than men. Those who had fewer vacation days were
slightly more receptive to having comp time, suggesting again that reduced
hours appeals more to workers whose non-work time is scarce. Among
those who are not paid for their extra hours, 31% would prefer time off.71
Thus, a system of comp time would be more likely to improve worker
well-being if it were available to exempt employees, as opposed to the
non-exempt employees currently governed by the FLSA overtime pay
regulations.72 This underscores the notion that the well-being effects of
work week changes will depend on the extent that they are delivered to
those who actually prefer them, and whether the additional uses of time are
either welfare- or efficiency-enhancing. In addition, the timing of work
and employee control over such work may matter as much as, if not more
than, the duration of work hours. Thus, reforms that would reduce work
time must consider nuances in differences among workers by job type and
income level.73 Reforms should target those types of jobs and workers
most likely to be overemployed and to have a lack of control over the
timing of their work; create or preserve employment opportunities; and be
subsidized through programs such as STC, in order to avoid unintended
reductions in worker well-being.
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